CS-062mixed
Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd
Generation build programme (Medupi and Kusile) and successive turnaround attempts (2007–2025)
- Region
- Africa
- Country
- South Africa
- Industry
- Electric Power Utilities
- Functions
- Operations & Service Delivery, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Risk, Compliance & Internal Audit, Procurement & Strategic Sourcing, Finance & FP&A, Treasury & Working Capital
- Topics
- Investment capital is not generating returns; Cash is trapped and liquidity is tightening; Operations cannot meet demand efficiently; Regulatory complexity is overwhelming controls; Bureaucracy and slow decisions prevent agility; Supplier inflation and procurement leakage are unsustainable
- Starting situation
- Stalled or failing (turnaround)
- Period
- 2007–2025
- Last verified
- 1 November 2026
Executive summary
Eskom, South Africa's state electricity utility, ran out of spare capacity in 2007–08 and declared a national electricity emergency in January 2008 [C02]. Its answer was a build programme centred on two large coal stations, Medupi and Kusile, with R343bn of spending planned over its first five years [C03]. Medupi was completed in 2021, and the build programme only in September 2025, with Kusile's last unit [C15, C19].
The three numbers that matter: Medupi's and Kusile's budgets rose from R79bn and R81bn to R145bn and R161.4bn [C15]; load shedding reached 3,773 hours in 2022, as the fleet's availability fell to 58.1% [C16]; and the state granted R254bn of debt relief in 2023 [C17].
Outcome: classed mixed, not failure (see the note in the outcome basis). The build programme was completed years late at about double its budgets, official inquiries found governance and procurement failures, and the utility needed state rescue [C08, C15, C17]. But Eskom reported its first profit in about eight years in 2025 and load shedding fell to 13 days, although its auditor still flagged a material uncertainty over going concern [C20, C21].
The one lesson, as the KB reads it: a megaproject cannot rescue a utility whose governance, procurement and maintenance are failing at the same time; the order of repair matters.
Outcome: mixed
Documented shortfalls or reversals sit alongside documented gains. For example: an initial failure later recovered, or a strategic goal met while a major adverse event in the same programme was recorded.
Basis of the outcome
Documented shortfalls: Medupi and Kusile budgets roughly doubled and completion slipped from 2012 to 2021 and 2025 (S11, S15); the Zondo Commission found officials acted unlawfully in a coal contract (S04) and Parliament's inquiry concluded the board failed to hold executives to account (S03); record load shedding in 2022 (S12); R254bn of state debt relief (S13). Documented gains: the build programme completed in September 2025 (S15), and a profit after tax of R16.0bn with load shedding on 13 days in 2024/25 (S16, S17) — company-reported, with a qualified audit and a going-concern uncertainty (S17). Strictly under §4.3, no source read records the programme abandoned or written down or an official finding calling the build a failure, and the 2025 recovery is a documented later gain. The class is mixed, not failure. Mixed applies under the outcome criteria because the programme's own shortfalls remain at the end of the period: a qualified audit with a going-concern uncertainty, municipal arrears up to R94.6bn, and continuing dependence on state support (S17). Failure is not met: the build was completed rather than abandoned, no source read records it written down, and the official findings (Zondo, Parliament) concern procurement and governance, not the build programme as a whole. Turnaround is not chosen: one profitable year, helped by a once-off tax recovery and with the going-concern uncertainty unresolved, is not yet a sustained return (S16, S17).
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Reserve margin | ≈8% (vs 15% norm) | FY2008 | company_reported |
| Before | Net profit | R974m (2007: R6,476m) | FY2008 | company_reported |
| Before | Build programme | R343bn to 2013; 16,304 MW by 2017 | 2008 | company_reported |
| Before | Shortage cost to economy (NERSA) | ≈R50bn | 2008 | press_reported |
| During | Medupi budget | R79bn → R145bn (excl. FGD) | 2007 → 2022 | company_reported |
| During | Kusile budget | R81bn → R161.4bn | 2008 → 2022 | company_reported |
| During | Net loss / debt | ≈R20.7bn / >R440bn | FY2019 | company_reported |
| During | Fleet availability (EAF) | 71.8% → 58.1% | 2018 → 2022 | academic |
| During | Load shedding | 3,773 hours; 8,301 GWh | 2022 | academic |
| During | Net loss | R23.9bn; load shedding on 280 days | FY2023 | company_reported |
| During | State debt relief | R254bn over three years | Feb 2023 | press_reported |
| After | Build programme complete | Kusile Unit 6; 9,600 MW | 29 Sep 2025 | company_reported |
| After | Profit after tax | R16.0bn (FY2024: −R55bn) | FY2025 | company_reported |
| After | Load shedding | 13 days (from 329) | FY2025 | company_reported |
| After | Municipal arrears | R94.6bn (+27%) | FY2025 | company_reported |
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- academic
- A university or peer-reviewed publication.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsBuild independent challenge into the board for transformational bets BP-024
- SupportsSeparate the programme's own effect from tailwinds, shocks and one-off gains before claiming credit BP-035
- SupportsFix the core product and operation before amplifying the channel or scaling the new strategy BP-045
- SupportsWhen the state or a rescuer funds or controls the company, write down its test, conditions and role, and plan the exit from its support BP-048
- SupportsProtect the integrity of procurement and appointments, and test feasibility before signing long contracts BP-068
Sources
- S01 Annual Report 2008 · Eskom Holdings Limited, Eskom Holdings Limited, 2008 (year ended 31 March 2008) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S02 Nersa: Power crisis cost SA about R50bn · not stated, Mail & Guardian, 2008-08-26 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S03 Final Report on the Eskom Inquiry · Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises, Parliament of South Africa, Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises (copy hosted by UCT GSB), 2018-11 (from file name; finalised after March 2018) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S04 Report: Part IV, Vol. 4 — The Capture of Eskom · Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (Chair: Justice R.M.M. Zondo), Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector (Zondo Commission), via SAFLII, 2022-04-29 (handed to the Presidency; see S05) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S05 State Capture report fourth part released · SAnews, SAnews (South African Government News Agency), 2022-04-29 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S06 Zondo recommends former Eskom executives Koko and Singh face criminal charges · Sarah Smit, Mail & Guardian, 2022-04-29 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S07 Matshela Koko takes the Zondo report on review · Nompilo Goba, Sunday World, 2022-12-23 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S08 Eskom on its 2018/19 Annual Report · Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Parliamentary Monitoring Group (record of the Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises), 2019-10-09 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S09 Cabinet drums up support for energy plan · SAnews, SAnews (South African Government News Agency), 2019-10-31 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S10 ANTON EBERHARD: Competition is the balm to heal Eskom · Anton Eberhard, Business Day (copy hosted by UCT Graduate School of Business), 2019-10-31 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S11 Fresh delays at Medupi and Kusile amid eye-watering costs · Staff Writer, BusinessTech, 2022-10-19 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S12 Statistics of utility-scale power generation in South Africa, 2022 · Warrick Pierce and Monique Le Roux, CSIR Energy Centre (copy hosted by DevelopmentAid), 2023-02 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S13 Conditions linked to R254bn Eskom debt relief may lead to concessioning of coal plants · not stated, Engineering News, 2023-02-22 (from URL) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S14 Eskom releases its results for the 2022/23 Financial Year · Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, 2023-10-31 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S15 Kusile Unit 6 achieves commercial operation, unlocking full 9600MW capacity across Eskom's flagship stations · Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, 2025-09-29 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S16 Load shedding at bay, profits up: Eskom announces R23.9bn profit before tax · SAnews, SAnews (South African Government News Agency), 2025-09-30 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S17 Group annual results for the year ended 31 March 2025 (presentation) · Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, 2025-09-30 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S18 Eskom Inquiry report: adoption · Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Parliamentary Monitoring Group (record of the Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises), 2018-11-28 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S19 Zondo commission – Singh grilled on Tegeta pre-payment · not stated, Corruption Watch (hosted file), 2021-05-24 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S20 Koko vs Zondo - the Eskom Bundle legal battle on both sides to prove flouting of court procedure · Dianne Hawker-Kalubi, Daily Maverick, 2025-04-03 (updated 2025-04-04) · accessed 2026-11-01
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 1 November 2026
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