CS-072turnaround
Best Buy Co., Inc.
Renew Blue turnaround (November 2012 to fiscal 2017)
- Region
- North America
- Country
- United States, Canada
- Industry
- Specialty Retail and Omnichannel Commerce
- Functions
- Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Sales & Revenue Operations, Customer Experience & Support, Supply Chain & Logistics, Finance & FP&A, HR & Workforce
- Topics
- Revenue growth has stalled; Margins are eroding despite revenue; The business model is being disrupted; Pricing and customer profitability are deteriorating; Customer churn and dissatisfaction are accelerating; Investment capital is not generating returns
- Starting situation
- Stalled or failing (turnaround)
- Period
- 2012–2017
- Last verified
- 1 November 2026
Executive summary
Best Buy, the largest US consumer-electronics retailer, launched 'Renew Blue' in November 2012, three months after Hubert Joly became chief executive, while it was losing money, losing sales to online rivals and facing a founder who wanted to take it private [C01, C03, C06]. The plan matched online prices, rented store space to vendors such as Samsung, shipped online orders from stores, cut more than $1bn of annualized cost, and exited Europe, China and the Future Shop brand in Canada [C07, C08, C09, C12, C13, C15].
The three numbers that matter: a net loss of $1,231m in fiscal 2012, turned into net earnings of $532m in fiscal 2014 and diluted EPS of $3.74 in fiscal 2017 [C01, C12, C17]; $1.02bn of annualized Renew Blue cost reductions by early 2015 against an original $725m target [C05, C13]; and domestic online revenue rising to 18.6% of domestic revenue in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2017 [C17].
Outcome: classed turnaround under schema §4.3. The company started in documented distress — consecutive losses and falling comparable sales — and reported a sustained return to profit; it declared Renew Blue over in March 2017 [C01, C04, C12, C17]. Two limits are recorded: comparable sales recovered only to roughly flat-to-low-single-digit growth, and the long-term operating-margin target of five to six percent set in 2012 had not been reached by fiscal 2017, though no date had been attached to it [C03, C16, C17].
The one lesson, as the KB reads it: Best Buy treated its stores as an asset to be re-used rather than a cost to be cut — it removed price as a reason to leave, sold space to vendors and turned stores into fulfilment points, and cut non-salary cost before headcount [C07, C12, C19].
Outcome: turnaround
The company started in documented distress (losses, near-insolvency, rescue) and then reported a sustained return to profit or growth.
Basis of the outcome
Documented distress: a net loss of $1,231m in fiscal 2012 and $441m in the 11-month fiscal 2013, with comparable sales down 4.3% in Q3 FY2013 (S01, S04, S12). Sustained return to profit: net earnings of $532m in fiscal 2014 and GAAP diluted EPS of $3.74 from continuing operations in fiscal 2017 (S12, S17). The programme's dated or near-term aims were met: the $725m cost target was exceeded and raised (S05, S12, S13), and the near-term aim to stabilise and then grow comparable sales and operating margin (S03) was met, with domestic comparable sales positive in FY2015–FY2017 and the non-GAAP operating income rate rising from 4.0% to 4.5% in FY2016–FY2017 (S13, S15, S17). The company declared Renew Blue over in March 2017 (S17); the period therefore runs to fiscal 2017 (ended January 2017) and that statement. The 5–6% operating-margin target was an aspiration to be reached 'over time', with no date (S03). An undated target cannot be missed within the period, so, consistently with the outcome criteria, under which a missing target is not a missed target, its not having been reached by fiscal 2017 (non-GAAP 4.5%) is recorded but not counted as a shortfall. The international exits, the expected Europe impairment and the Canadian closures were the programme's own planned portfolio moves, not reversals (S09, S16).
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Net result attributable | −$1,231m (FY2012, to 3 Mar 2012) | FY2012 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| Before | Operating income | $2,374m → $1,085m | FY2011–FY2012 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| Before | Q3 FY2013 comparable store sales; adjusted operating income | −4.3%; $48m (−87%) | Q3 to 3 Nov 2012 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| Before | Employees; locations | ≈167,000; ≈1,400 | 2012 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| Before | Long-term targets set | 5–6% operating margin; 13–15% ROIC | 13 Nov 2012 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| During | Cost reduction target / achieved | $725m target → $765m eliminated; target raised to $1bn | FY2014 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| During | Best Buy Europe stake sold | £500m | Apr–Jun 2013 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| During | Vendor stores-within-a-store | 1,400 Samsung; 600 Windows | FY2014 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| During | Holiday domestic comparable sales; share move | −0.9%; >30% premarket fall | Jan 2014 | press_reported |
| During | Renew Blue annualized cost reductions | $1.02bn | Mar 2015 | company_reported |
| During | Future Shop stores closed / converted | 66 / 65 | Mar 2015 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| After | Net earnings attributable | $532m (FY2014) | FY2014 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| After | Enterprise revenue; domestic comparable sales | $39,403m; +0.2% | FY2017 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| After | Non-GAAP operating income rate | 4.0% (FY2016); 4.5% (FY2017) | FY2016–FY2017 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
| After | Domestic online share of revenue (Q4) | 15.6% (FY2016) → 18.6% (FY2017) | Q4 FY2016–FY2017 | regulatory_filing_unaudited |
- regulatory_filing_unaudited
- Text in an 8-K, 6-K or 10-Q, which is filed with a regulator but not audited.
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsTie every benefit to the financial statements, bank it before counting it, and keep tracking after the programme ends BP-010
- SupportsAfter a control or conduct failure, fix governance, leadership and incentives before strategy, and keep individual accountability proportionate and separate BP-025
- SupportsSecure the owners' backing and patience in advance, engage challengers on the evidence, and hold course through early setbacks BP-032
- SupportsFix the core product and operation before amplifying the channel or scaling the new strategy BP-045
- SupportsPair cost reduction with a growth strategy, and protect the investments that define the future while cutting BP-046
- SupportsDivest what does not fit the core by a stated criterion, including prestige and profitable businesses BP-050
- SupportsBuild the digital channel on the physical network, not around it BP-059
- SupportsDiagnose the root cause and the gap to the best before choosing the remedy BP-069
Sources
- S01 Best Buy Co., Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 3, 2012 · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2012-05 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S02 Best Buy release on the Audit Committee investigation and chairman succession (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2012-05-14 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S03 Best Buy investor and analyst meeting release: Renew Blue (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2012-11-13 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S04 Best Buy reports third quarter fiscal 2013 results (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2012-11-20 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S05 Best Buy statement on Renew Blue cost reductions (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2013-02-26 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S06 Best Buy cuts staff at HQ, slashes budget by $725M · Christopher Sacco, Retail Dive, 2013-02-28 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S07 Best Buy's anti-showrooming price match starts Sunday 3/3 · Michael Rose, Engadget, 2013-03-01 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S08 Samsung mini-stores propel Best Buy stock · Martin Moylan, MPR News, 2013-04-04 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S09 Best Buy to sell its 50% interest in Best Buy Europe to Carphone Warehouse (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2013-04-30 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S10 Best Buy's price-shredding turnaround is working · not stated, Bloomberg, 2013-08-20 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S11 Best Buy holiday same-store sales fall · Reuters, CNBC (Reuters), 2014-01-16 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S12 Best Buy Co., Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 1, 2014 · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2014-03 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S13 Best Buy reports fourth quarter results · Best Buy Co., Inc., Best Buy (investor relations), 2015-03-03 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S14 Best Buy consolidates Canadian business, closes 66 Future Shop stores · not stated, Retail TouchPoints, 2015-03 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S15 Best Buy reports better-than-expected fourth quarter results (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2016-02-25 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S16 Best Buy Co., Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 30, 2016 · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2016-03 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S17 Best Buy reports fourth quarter fiscal 2017 results (Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K) · Best Buy Co., Inc., US Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), 2017-03-01 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S18 Best Buy CEO: we've fixed what was broken, now focus is on growth · not stated, CNBC, 2017-09-19 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S19 Transformation and resilience: an interview with Best Buy's executive chairman Hubert Joly · Becca Coggins (interviewer), McKinsey & Company (Inside the Strategy Room podcast), 2020-06-25 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S20 Best Buy: how human connection saved a failing retailer · Michael Blanding, HBS Working Knowledge, 2021-05-04 · accessed 2026-11-01
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 1 November 2026
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