CS-090mixed
FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation (Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. until 2006)
Diversification after the decline of film: VISION75, structural reform and redeployment of film technology (2000–2010)
- Region
- East Asia
- Country
- Japan
- Industry
- Chemicals and Process Manufacturing
- Functions
- Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Product, R&D & Innovation, Manufacturing & Production, HR & Workforce, Finance & FP&A
- Topics
- The business model is being disrupted; Revenue growth has stalled; Innovation is too slow to defend competitiveness; Workforce costs and capacity no longer match demand; Investment capital is not generating returns
- Starting situation
- New initiative
- Period
- 2000–2010
- Last verified
- 1 November 2026
Executive summary
In 2000 photographic products gave Fujifilm 60% of its sales and two-thirds of its profit; within a decade digital photography had largely destroyed that business [C01]. Under Shigetaka Komori, president from 2000 and chief executive from 2003, Fujifilm took control of Fuji Xerox, restructured its film business with about 5,000 job cuts and ¥165bn of costs, adopted the VISION75 plan in 2004, and redeployed film chemistry into flat-panel display films, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics [C03, C04, C05, C11, C12, C17].
The three numbers that matter: photo film fell from about 19% of sales in 2001 to about 2% by 2010, while display materials rose from about 2% to 10% [C02]; restructuring cost about ¥348.7bn across 2005–2010 by one academic's count [C02]; and the January 2006 target of ¥280bn–300bn of operating income for the year to March 2011 compares with company guidance of about ¥140bn [C05, C09].
Outcome: classed mixed. Fujifilm survived the collapse of its core business with revenue near ¥2.2 trillion and a new portfolio [C02, C08]. But its own dated profit target for March 2011 was not met, fiscal 2009 was a loss-making year, and in 2010 an academic case study judged the transformation's success not yet clear [C03, C08, C09].
The one lesson, as the KB reads it: Fujifilm built its new businesses from what its film technology could do, not from what its film customers bought [C02, C03, C11].
Outcome: mixed
Documented shortfalls or reversals sit alongside documented gains. For example: an initial failure later recovered, or a strategic goal met while a major adverse event in the same programme was recorded.
Basis of the outcome
Documented gains: Fujifilm survived the collapse of its core business; photo film fell from about 19% of sales in 2001 to about 2% by 2010 while flat-panel display materials rose from about 2% to 10% (S05); revenue held at about ¥2.2 trillion (S07); new businesses in display films, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics were built (S05, S07); and The Economist described it as solidly profitable in 2012 (S09). Documented shortfalls of the programme itself remaining at period end: the dated target, set in the January 2006 reform, of ¥280bn–300bn of operating income for the year to March 2011 (S02) against guidance of about ¥140bn (S08), with no year from fiscal 2009 to fiscal 2012 above about ¥136.4bn and an operating loss in fiscal 2009 (S07); repeated restructuring charges totalling about ¥348.7bn in 2005–2010 (S05); and an academic judgement in October 2010 that the transformation's success was not yet clear (S05). Under the outcome criteria the class is mixed rather than success. The ¥200bn target for the year to March 2008 was forecast to be met (¥210bn, February 2008, S15), but no source read reports the outturn. The sources do not separate the effect of the 2008–2009 financial crisis from programme performance. The ¥280bn–300bn target is the programme's own dated target, set in the January 2006 reform, and the shortfall against it remained at period end. As in the CBA (CS-063) and Wells Fargo (CS-081) cases, a shortfall against the programme's own target counts whatever its cause, so the unseparated effect of the financial crisis does not exclude it. A met 2008 target, if confirmed, would be a gain within the period; it would not reverse the 2011 shortfall.
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Photographic products' share of sales; of profit | 60%; two-thirds | 2000 | company_reported |
| Before | Expected v. actual decline in film demand | ≈10% a year expected; 20%–30% a year actual | from 2000 | academic |
| Before | Operating margin | >10% (declining) | 1997–2000 | academic |
| During | Fuji Xerox stake | Additional 25% bought, taking it to 75% (consolidated) | Mar 2001 | company_reported |
| During | Structural reform | ≈5,000 people; ¥165bn | Jan 2006 | company_reported |
| During | Imaging Solutions result | Operating loss of ¥75.7bn on revenue of ¥689.4bn | Year to Mar 2006 | press_reported |
| During | Group revenue; operating income; net income | ¥2,667.5bn; ¥70.4bn; ¥37.0bn | Year to Mar 2006 | press_reported |
| During | Operating income targets | ¥200bn (year to Mar 2008); ¥280bn–300bn (year to Mar 2011) | Set Jan 2006 | company_reported |
| During | Toyama Chemical | ≈¥130bn; consolidated Mar 2008 | 2008 | academic |
| After | Photo film share of sales | ≈19% (2001) → ≈2% (year to Mar 2010) | 2001–2010 | academic |
| After | Flat-panel display materials share of sales | ≈2% → ≈10% | 2001–2010 | academic |
| After | Revenue; operating result | ¥2,181.7bn; loss of ¥42.1bn | Fiscal 2009 (to Mar 2010) | company_reported |
| After | Guided operating income after restructuring | ≈¥140bn | Year to Mar 2011 | press_reported |
| After | Cumulative restructuring costs | ≈¥348.7bn (2005–2010) | 2010 | academic |
| After | Market value | ≈US$12.6bn (Kodak ≈US$220m) | Jan 2012 | press_reported |
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
- academic
- A university or peer-reviewed publication.
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsMake a few quantified, dated commitments, publish them, and report against them, including the misses BP-004
- SupportsPlan workforce change as a funded people programme: delayer first, share the upside, and redeploy where you can BP-049
- SupportsBuy the capabilities the new strategy lacks rather than building all of them BP-053
- SupportsPlan on the downside: assume the legacy business declines faster and the cycle turns, and have the cost playbook ready BP-054
- SupportsTest whether your capabilities really transfer before betting on a new market or exporting a model BP-056
Sources
- S01 Corporate history · FUJIFILM, FUJIFILM Corporation, not printed (covers events to October 2006) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S02 5,000 job losses at Fujifilm (republishing Fujifilm's press release) · Mark Goldstein (blog); Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. (release), Photography Blog, 2006-01-31 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S03 Fujifilm announces structural reform of Imaging Solutions (in Japanese) · not stated, Impress Watch (デジカメWatch), 2006-02-01 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S04 Fujifilm results for the year ended March 2006 (in Japanese) · not stated, Impress Watch (デジカメWatch), 2006-04-27 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S05 コア事業転換の構図 ―富士フィルム・ホールディングスの事例― (The structure of core business conversion: the case of FUJIFILM Holdings) · Ishizaka (石坂庸祐), Bulletin of the Faculty of Economics, Kyushu Kyoritsu University, no. 122, 2010-10 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S06 Fujifilm chairman and CEO explains the company's dramatic transformation in new book · Source credited: Fujifilm, Printing Impressions (NAPCO Media), 2015-06-18 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S07 富士フイルムグループの成長戦略 (FUJIFILM Group's growth strategy), investor presentation · Mitsuhiro Okamoto, FUJIFILM Holdings, FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation (hosted by the Sapporo Securities Exchange), c. 2014-02 (not printed; data to 30 January 2014) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S08 Fujifilm results improve (analyst blog) · Zacks Investment Research, Benzinga (Zacks Investment Research), c. 2011-01 (not printed; URL dated 2011/01) · accessed 2026-11-01
- S09 Kodak vs. Fujifilm: a tale of two film makers · not stated, PetaPixel (quoting The Economist), 2012-01-16 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S10 Why Kodak died and Fujifilm thrived: a tale of two film companies · not stated, PetaPixel, 2018-10-19 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S11 Innovator Komori transformed Fujifilm · Kim Ki-whan, Korea JoongAng Daily, 2016-08-28 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S12 Komori era comes to an end at Fujifilm · not stated, Print Business, 2021-04-05 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S13 Fuji (Fujifilm): internal restructuring, Netherlands (factsheet 87493) · Eurofound, Eurofound, European Restructuring Monitor, 2016-04-05 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S14 Fujifilm President and CEO Shigetaka Komori named PMDA 'Person of the Year' (press release, republished) · FUJIFILM, The Imaging Resource (republishing a Fujifilm press release), 2009-03-03 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S15 Earnings of fiscal 2008 3Q ended December 31, 2007 (investor presentation) · Fujifilm, Fujifilm (third-party upload to SlideShare), 2008-02-08 · accessed 2026-11-01
- S16 沿革・歴史 (Company history), FUJIFILM Healthcare Laboratory Co., Ltd. · FUJIFILM Healthcare Laboratory, FUJIFILM Healthcare Laboratory Co., Ltd. (Fujifilm Group), not printed · accessed 2026-11-01
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 1 November 2026
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