CS-003failure
Queensland Health (State of Queensland), with IBM as prime contractor
Queensland Health payroll replacement (LATTICE replacement under the CorpTech shared-services programme)
- Region
- Oceania
- Country
- Australia
- Industry
- Public Sector and Government (Hospitals and Health Systems)
- Functions
- HR & Workforce, IT, ERP & Digital, Procurement & Strategic Sourcing, Risk, Compliance & Internal Audit
- Topics
- Legacy ERP and fragmented systems block execution; Cross-functional processes are slow and broken; Service delivery is too slow, unreliable or expensive; Regulatory complexity is overwhelming controls
- Starting situation
- New initiative
- Period
- 2007–2013
- Last verified
- 31 October 2026
Executive summary
Queensland Health's payroll replacement began as the first priority of a whole-of-government shared-services programme and became, in the words of a Commission of Inquiry, a candidate for the worst failure in Australian public administration [C01, C28]. IBM was contracted as prime contractor in December 2007 to deliver the payroll by 31 July 2008; it went live on 14 March 2010 after ten aborted attempts [C02, C04, C05]. Thousands of staff were unpaid or paid wrongly, and a working payroll eventually needed about 1,000 people processing data each fortnight [C11, C12]. The three numbers that matter: a fixed-price contract of A$6.19m for the LATTICE replacement that grew past A$24m through more than 47 change requests [C38]; about 24,000 pay-rule combinations the scope had treated as a like-for-like swap [C36, C37]; and a KPMG estimate of A$1.25bn total cost for FY2010–FY2017 [C47]. The official record places causes on both sides: unclear governance and a go-live without a full parallel run (Auditor-General), urgency and a lack of diligence by State officials (the Commission, as summarised by a law firm), and procurement failings that led the Commission, as reported by IEEE Spectrum, to say IBM should not have been appointed [C40, C41, C30, C09]. The one lesson: in a domain with deep rule complexity, the go-live gate must measure the risk to the people being paid, and no deadline set by a legacy contract justifies passing it untested [C43, C17].
Outcome: failure
The initiative was abandoned, exited or written down, or an official finding called it a failure.
Basis of the outcome
A Commission of Inquiry called the go-live a catastrophic failure and estimated that the system would cost about A$1.2bn over the following eight years. The Government apologised to staff in Parliament.
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Shared Service Solutions capital budget | A$125m | Aug 2005 | official_finding |
| Before | LATTICE vendor support end | 30 Jun 2008 | 2007 | official_finding |
| Before | Programme budget at May 2007 review | A$316m, projected to run out Jun 2008 | May 2007 | official_finding |
| Before | Pay-rule combinations | about 24,000 (13 awards, 205 allowances, 223 calculation groups) | 2010 | official_finding |
| During | IBM prime contract price vs forecast to complete | A$98m vs A$181m | Oct 2008 | official_finding |
| During | LATTICE replacement contract value | A$6.19m → over A$24m (47+ change requests) | Dec 2007–Mar 2010 | official_finding |
| During | Scope sign-off | Sep 2009, about 20 months in | 2009 | official_finding |
| During | Go-live | 14 Mar 2010, after ten aborted attempts | 2010 | official_finding |
| During | Total cost to end Mar 2010 | A$101.96m | Mar 2010 | official_finding |
| After | Payroll staff / manual processes per fortnight | 1,010 / about 200,000 | May 2012 | official statement (commissioned review by KPMG, tabled in Parliament; not an audit or a government statement) |
| After | Overpayments outstanding | about A$91m (of A$112.3m) | May 2012 | official statement (commissioned review by KPMG, tabled in Parliament; not an audit or a government statement) |
| After | Total cost FY2010–FY2017 (KPMG) | A$1,253.5m | May 2012 | official statement (commissioned review by KPMG, tabled in Parliament; not an audit or a government statement) |
| After | Commission's forward cost estimate | about A$1.2bn over eight years | Jul 2013 | official_finding |
| After | Commission of Inquiry budget | A$5m | 2012–2013 | official_finding |
- official_finding
- A finding of an inquiry, court or regulator.
- official_statement
- A government or ministerial statement. It is official, but political, and is not a finding.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsGate every go-live on measured readiness, not on the calendar BP-001
- SupportsName one accountable sponsor, keep sponsorship stable, and treat a leadership change as a re-baselining event BP-003
- SupportsSimplify what you sell and the rules you run before you automate or scale them BP-011
- SupportsBudget the whole-life cost of a core programme, treat budget rises as new decisions, and retire legacy on a dated plan BP-013
- SupportsDecide what litigation or a dispute is for, and settle against its full cost and duration BP-067
- SupportsProtect the integrity of procurement and appointments, and test feasibility before signing long contracts BP-068
Sources
- S01 Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry Report · Hon. Richard N. Chesterman AO RFD QC, Commissioner, Queensland Parliament (tabled paper), 2013-07-31 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S02 Ministerial media statement on the Parliament apology to Queensland Health workers · Lawrence Springborg, Minister for Health, Queensland Government, 2013-08-08 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S03 Queensland Government Bans IBM from IT Contracts · Robert N. Charette, IEEE Spectrum, 2013-08-07 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S04 Qld Health payroll report slams worst-ever IT project · staff, GovTechReview, 2013-08-08 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S05 Court drops IBM's costs on Queensland government · Richard Chirgwin, The Register, 2016-04-07 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S06 Report to Parliament No. 7 for 2010: Information systems governance and control, including the Queensland Health Implementation of Continuity Project · Glenn Poole, Auditor-General, Queensland Audit Office (Auditor-General of Queensland), 2010-06 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S07 Review of the Queensland Health Payroll System · KPMG, KPMG for Queensland Health (Queensland Parliament tabled paper), 2012-05-31 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S08 IBM Australia Ltd v State of Queensland [2016] QSC 70 · Martin J, Supreme Court of Queensland, 2016-04-04 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S09 The architects of Qld Health's payroll disaster · Charis Palmer, iTnews, 2013-08-12 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S10 Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry Report: contract management lessons · David Jacobson, Bright Law, 2013-08-09 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S11 Queensland Health Payroll System One of the Worst IT Projects Ever · Robert N. Charette, IEEE Spectrum, 2012-06-13 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S12 Woeful scope definition caused Qld payroll disaster · Renai LeMay, Delimiter, 2010-06-29 · accessed 2026-10-31
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 31 October 2026
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