CS-020failure
TSB Bank plc (subsidiary of Banco de Sabadell)
Core-banking migration from Lloyds Banking Group systems to Proteo4UK (April 2018)
- Region
- Western Europe
- Country
- United Kingdom, Spain
- Industry
- Retail and Investment Banking (Commercial Banking)
- Functions
- IT, ERP & Digital, Risk, Compliance & Internal Audit, Procurement & Strategic Sourcing, Customer Experience & Support, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office
- Topics
- Legacy ERP and fragmented systems block execution; Cyber and technology risks threaten continuity; Service delivery is too slow, unreliable or expensive; Customer churn and dissatisfaction are accelerating; Regulatory complexity is overwhelming controls; M&A integration or corporate complexity is destroying value
- Starting situation
- In-flight initiative
- Period
- 2015–2018
- Last verified
- 1 November 2026
Executive summary
In April 2018 TSB, a UK retail bank with about 5.2 million customers, moved its customer data off Lloyds Banking Group's systems and onto Proteo4UK, a platform built and run by its Spanish parent Sabadell's IT subsidiary SABIS [C03, C04, C05, C22]. The data moved correctly, but online, telephone, mobile, branch and card services failed; all 550 branches were affected and TSB did not return to business as usual until December 2018 [C22, C47]. The chief executive left in September 2018 [C35]. The UK regulators later found that TSB had not adequately organised and controlled the programme or managed the risks of outsourcing it [C46].
The three numbers that matter: £330.2m of post-migration charges and waived income in TSB's 2018 accounts [C29]; about 204,000 complaints after migration [C32]; and £48.65m of FCA and PRA fines in December 2022 [C45]. The documented causes are specific: testing ran on one data centre when production ran on two, the two were configured inconsistently, assurance from the supplier was accepted without being tested, and the Board considered the go-live with eight 'must-have' areas still open [C11, C12, C13, C16, C57].
KB analysis — the one lesson: a migration deadline that is announced before the plan is rebuilt becomes the plan, and every later gate is then judged against the date rather than against evidence of readiness [C08, C15].
Outcome: failure
The initiative was abandoned, exited or written down, or an official finding called it a failure.
Basis of the outcome
The FCA and PRA found that TSB did not adequately organise and control the migration programme or manage the risks of outsourcing it, and fined it £48.65m (S02, S03). The go-live disrupted every channel until business as usual returned in December 2018, and TSB booked £330.2m of post-migration charges and waived income and a 2018 statutory loss (S08). The data migration itself succeeded and the platform remained in use; the failure classification applies to the go-live and its governance, not to the platform design, which TSB maintains was sound.
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Takeover price / expected IT saving | £1.7bn / £160m a year | 2015 | press_reported |
| Before | Lloyds contribution to migration | £450m (announced); £318.3m received for TSA exit | 2015 / 2018 | press_reported |
| Before | Customers | about 5.2 million | 2015-2018 | official_finding |
| Before | Target migration date | 5 Nov 2017 → Q1 2018 announced → 20-22 Apr 2018 | 2016-2018 | official_finding |
| During | Go-live memo / open must-have areas | 972 pages / 8 | 18 Apr 2018 | official_finding |
| During | Customer records transferred | around 8 million | 22 Apr 2018 | company_reported |
| During | Branches affected | all 550 | Apr 2018 | official_finding |
| After | Post-migration charges and waived income | £330.2m | 2018 | audited_filing |
| After | Statutory result before tax (TSB Bank plc) | £159.1m profit → £101.0m loss | 2017 → 2018 | audited_filing |
| After | Complaints after migration | about 204,000 | to Jan 2019 | company_reported |
| After | Net Promoter Score | 27 → minus 9 | 2018 | company_reported |
| After | Recovery from SABIS | £153.0m (provisional) | 2018 | audited_filing |
| After | Customer redress (regulators' figure) | £32.7m | by Dec 2022 | official_finding |
| After | FCA + PRA fines | £48.65m (£69.5m before discount) | 20 Dec 2022 | official_finding |
| After | Fine on former CIO (PRA) | £81,620 | 13 Apr 2023 | official_finding |
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- official_finding
- A finding of an inquiry, court or regulator.
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
- audited_filing
- A figure in audited financial statements, such as an annual report's financial statements or a 10-K.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsGate every go-live on measured readiness, not on the calendar BP-001
- SupportsSequence customer-facing cutovers last, rehearse failure at full scale, and make resilience a programme outcome BP-014
- SupportsTreat vendor attestations, awards and executive testimony as claims to test, not as assurance BP-019
- SupportsBuild independent challenge into the board for transformational bets BP-024
- SupportsInvestigate failures independently at full scale, let outsiders validate the fix, and turn the findings into permanent checks BP-026
- SupportsAnnounce only targets the evidence supports, build synergy estimates from shared data, and re-base them openly BP-033
Sources
- S01 Final Notice to TSB Bank plc (FRN 191240) · Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority (Bank of England), 2022-12-20 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S02 TSB fined £48.65m for operational resilience failings · not stated, Bank of England, 2022-12-20 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S03 TSB fined £48.65m for operational resilience failings · not stated, Financial Conduct Authority, 2022-12-20 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S04 Final Notice to Carlos Abarca (former Chief Information Officer, TSB Bank plc) · Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority (Bank of England), 2023-04-13 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S05 Slaughter and May independent review published (TSB news release) · not stated, TSB Bank, 2019-11-19 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S06 TSB programme pulled apart in report on IT meltdown · not stated, Computer Weekly, 2019-11 (not printed on page) · accessed 2026-10-31
- S07 TSB publishes damning IT migration review · Peter Walker, FStech, 2019-11-19 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S08 TSB Bank plc Annual Report and Accounts 2018 · TSB Bank plc, TSB Bank plc, 2019 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S09 TSB announces 2019 full year results · not stated, TSB Banking Group, 2020-01-30 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S10 Sabadell agrees £1.7 billion takeover of TSB · not stated, Finextra, 2015-03 (not printed on page) · accessed 2026-10-31
- S11 IBM report suggests that TSB testing was not rigorous enough before computer meltdown · Jasper Jolly, City A.M., 2018-06-21 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S12 New Software System Snags TSB's Online and Mobile Banking Customers · Robert N. Charette, IEEE Spectrum, 2018-05-04 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S13 TSB CEO out after months of IT problems · not stated, Computer Weekly, 2018-09 (not printed on page) · accessed 2026-10-31
- S14 Bank IT failures 'unacceptable', says Treasury Committee report · Ross Kelly, DIGIT, 2019-10-28 · accessed 2026-10-31
- S15 TSB fined £48 million over botched migration · not stated, Computing, 2022-12 (not printed on page) · accessed 2026-10-31
- S16 IT failures in the Financial Services Sector: Government and Regulators' Responses to the Committee's Second Report (HC 114) · not stated, House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2020-03-13 · accessed 2026-10-31
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 1 November 2026
Practices, their evidence grades and case summaries are public. Full case studies are available in AXIOM to subscribers and AXIOM Discover participants.

