CS-200success
AB Klaipėdos nafta (KN, renamed KN Energies), majority state-owned oil and LNG terminal operator in Klaipėda, Lithuania, listed on Nasdaq Vilnius
Floating LNG import terminal 'Independence' at Klaipėda to end Lithuania's dependence on one gas supplier: lease agreed with Höegh LNG (2012), operations from late 2014, and purchase of the vessel (2024)
- Region
- Central and Eastern Europe
- Country
- Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway
- Industry
- Oil, Gas and Mining (Other (cross-industry))
- Functions
- Supply Chain & Logistics, Procurement & Strategic Sourcing, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Treasury & Working Capital, Risk, Compliance & Internal Audit
- Topics
- Supply chain disruption has made the network fragile; Supplier inflation and procurement leakage are unsustainable; Energy, resource or climate exposure undermines economics; Regulatory complexity is overwhelming controls
- Starting situation
- New initiative
- Period
- 2012–2024
- Last verified
- 5 November 2026
Executive summary
In 2012 Lithuania bought all its gas from Gazprom and, by its prime minister's account, paid about US$100 per 1,000 cubic metres more than Germany for lack of alternatives [C01, C02]. Klaipėdos nafta, a state-controlled oil terminal operator with about 360 staff, was given the task of building an LNG import terminal to break that dependence [C01, C05].
The company leased a floating storage and regasification vessel, Independence, from Norway's Höegh LNG for ten years with an option to buy, financed the shore works with development-bank loans, and recovered fixed costs through a supplement on the gas transmission tariff [C04, C06, C07, C08]. Gazprom cut its price by about 20% before the terminal opened in late 2014 [C09, C10, C11].
The early years were costly: terminal gas was dearer than Gazprom's and the vessel was underused until 2019 [C12, C15]. But by 2021 it supplied most of Lithuania's imports, in April 2022 Lithuania stopped importing Russian gas, and in 2024 KN bought the vessel [C17, C18, C20]. The lesson: a supply-diversification investment is judged by the bargaining power and security it buys, which must be paid for by someone before the crisis that proves its value.
Outcome: success
The stated objectives were reported met, and the outcome was not later reversed by a write-down, exit or abandonment attributable to the initiative.
Basis of the outcome
The objective stated at the start was to reduce Lithuania's dependence on a single gas supplier, Gazprom, and to give access to international gas markets (S12); the company's 2014 results list competition through third-party access, diversification of sources, security of supply and import prices at world-market levels (S01). The government's one dated aim, a terminal established and operating by 3 December 2014 (S19), was met: operations began on 27 November 2014 on the company's account and officially on 3 December 2014 on the lender's (S01, S04). A 2012 legal rule that suppliers buy at least 25% of the country's gas through the terminal (S17) was a purchase obligation, not a performance target, and was scrapped in June 2013 before operations began (S18). No other dated numeric target for the project was found in the sources read, so the class rests on the stated security and diversification aims, which are reported met. Gazprom cut its price to Lithuania by more than 20% in 2014 as the terminal neared completion (S04, S09, S13). The terminal supplied more than 65% of Lithuania's gas imports in the first nine months of 2021 (S11), and when Lithuania stopped importing Russian gas in April 2022 it became the country's main source (S05, S14). By October 2024 it had dispatched about 15.6bn cubic metres to users in five countries (S02), and in December 2024 KN bought the vessel at the end of the ten-year lease (S14, S15). Documented shortfalls sit alongside: in its first years LNG cost more than Gazprom gas and the terminal was criticised as an expensive burden carried by gas users (S03), it struggled to use its capacity until 2019 (S16), and an early purchase of the vessel failed in 2015 (S07). None of these is a write-down, exit or abandonment.
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Premium over German gas price | US$100 per 1,000 m3 | 2012 | press_reported |
| Before | Employees | 361 | 2013 | company_reported |
| During | Annual lease cost | US$68.9m (about EUR 61m) | 2013-2015 | press_reported |
| During | Gazprom price cut | about 20% | 2014 | company_reported |
| During | Terminal versus Gazprom gas price | EUR 32.82 against EUR 17-18 per MWh | 2015 | press_reported |
| After | Share of imports | more than 65% | Jan-Sep 2021 | press_reported |
| After | Gas dispatched | about 15.6bn m3 | Oct 2024 | company_reported |
| After | Vessel purchase price | US$153.5m | Dec 2024 | press_reported |
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsBudget the whole-life cost of a core programme, treat budget rises as new decisions, and retire legacy on a dated plan BP-013
- SupportsBuild independent challenge into the board for transformational bets BP-024
- SupportsSecure the owners' backing and patience in advance, engage challengers on the evidence, and hold course through early setbacks BP-032
- SupportsSeparate the programme's own effect from tailwinds, shocks and one-off gains before claiming credit BP-035
- SupportsTreat regulators and the state as design constraints from day one, with priced remedies and a fallback BP-041
- SupportsWhen the state or a rescuer funds or controls the company, write down its test, conditions and role, and plan the exit from its support BP-048
- SupportsMake the economics work for every node of the ecosystem, and re-price shared contracts before you outgrow them BP-060
- SupportsTransform from strength, with a protected multi-year funding envelope or self-funding productivity BP-063
- SupportsMap critical dependencies several tiers deep, buffer what cannot be re-sourced, and decide who pays for resilience BP-064
- SupportsProtect the integrity of procurement and appointments, and test feasibility before signing long contracts BP-068
- SupportsUse partnerships to buy speed or share risk, but price in their execution risk and plan for some to fail BP-070
Sources
- S01 SC Klaipėdos Nafta 2014 Results · AB Klaipėdos nafta, Nasdaq Baltic (issuer disclosure), 2015 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S02 Facts and figures: Ten years of Lithuania's LNG terminal Independence · LRT.lt, LRT, 2024-10-30 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S03 Klaipėda LNG Terminal one year on: independence or responsibility? · DELFI EN / The Lithuania Tribune, LRT, 2015-11-11 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S04 Klaipeda LNG terminal: Competition adds energy security · Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Investment Bank, 2014-12-08 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S05 Lithuania has become the first European country to stop using Russian gas · Rob Schmitz, NPR, 2022-05 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S06 Auditors say price for Lithuanian LNG terminal's FSRU reasonable · not stated, 15min, 2013-09-26 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S07 Lithuanian gas terminal faces financial trouble: case study for Poland · Piotr Maciążek, Defence24, 2015-08-13 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S08 EU endorses Lithuania's LNG terminal subsidies after court battle · The Brussels Times Newsroom, The Brussels Times, 2026-04-07 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S09 Russian Gas Cheaper, Lithuania Considers Re-exporting LNG · Reuters, The Maritime Executive, 2015-04-13 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S10 KN secures FSRU Independence rent funds · not stated, Offshore Energy, 2019-12-23 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S11 Lithuanian LNG terminal turns seven: 'weapon against Russia's aggressive energy policy' · LRT Radijas, LRT.lt, LRT, 2021-11-04 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S12 Lithuania spearheads gas independence movement · not stated, The Moscow Times, 2012-07-05 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S13 Energy Minister: Gazprom price cut brings down Lithuanian LNG terminal's costs for consumers · BNS, The Lithuania Tribune, 2014-10-28 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S14 Lithuania to purchase its LNG terminal from Norwegian owner · BNS, LRT, 2024-11-29 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S15 Acquisition of FSRU Independence complete, marking milestone for Lithuania gas operations · not stated, Pipeline & Gas Journal, 2024-12-09 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S16 Imports Soar at Klaipeda LNG · Joseph Murphy, Natural Gas World, 2019-07-09 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S17 Lithuanian parliament approves LNG terminal construction · not stated, 15min, 2012-06-12 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S18 European Commission suspends probe after Lithuania drops 25 percent rule · not stated, 15min, 2013-06-28 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S19 Regarding the Obligation on AB Klaipėdos Nafta to Establish the LNG Terminal · AB Klaipėdos nafta, GlobeNewswire (issuer announcement), 2012-02-15 · accessed 2026-11-05
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 5 November 2026
Practices, their evidence grades and case summaries are public. Full case studies are available in AXIOM to subscribers and AXIOM Discover participants.

