CS-201failure
Kiwibank Limited (Wellington, New Zealand), the banking subsidiary of Kiwi Group Holdings, owned by New Zealand Post until October 2016 and then 53% by NZ Post, 25% by the NZ Superannuation Fund and 22% by ACC
CoreMod (Core Modification Programme): replacement of the Ultradata 'Ultracs' core banking system with SAP for Banking, announced February 2014 and closed in September 2017 after NZ$101m of impairments
- Region
- Oceania
- Country
- New Zealand
- Industry
- Retail and Investment Banking (Commercial Banking)
- Functions
- IT, ERP & Digital, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Finance & FP&A, Customer Experience & Support
- Topics
- Legacy ERP and fragmented systems block execution; Technology spending is growing without business returns; Investment capital is not generating returns; Competing transformation programs overwhelm resources
- Starting situation
- New initiative
- Period
- 2013–2017
- Last verified
- 5 November 2026
Executive summary
In February 2014 Kiwibank, New Zealand's largest locally owned bank, announced a progressive, three-to-four-year replacement of its Ultradata core banking system with SAP for Banking, at an estimated NZ$100m or more [C03, C04, C06]. The programme, called CoreMod, delivered its first phase, an SAP payments engine, in 2015 [C07, C08]. The core account and lending phases slipped, costs rose above the first estimate, and in July 2017 the bank disclosed that the project was behind schedule [C09, C10].
After new shareholders bought 47% of the bank in late 2016 and the board was renewed, a strategic review concluded that the programme would not meet its objectives [C11, C12, C16]. Kiwibank impaired NZ$90m in August 2017 and a further NZ$11m in the September quarter, and the board closed the project [C13, C21]. The new owners then lodged a warranty claim against NZ Post over the disclosure of CoreMod's risks [C25, C26].
The lesson for a mid-sized bank is that a core replacement chosen as a technology fix can be overtaken by the strategy it was meant to serve. The bank kept the payments phase and the old core, and a different, phased programme with other vendors began several years later [C27, C28, C29].
Outcome: failure
The initiative was abandoned, exited or written down, or an official finding called it a failure.
Basis of the outcome
The objective stated at the start was to replace Kiwibank's legacy core banking system through a progressive, four-year upgrade costing an estimated NZ$100m or more, to support the bank's growth and strategic plan (S11, S21). Three documented facts support the failure class. (1) The programme was abandoned: in September 2017 the board closed it, stating that its delivery path would not meet the bank's key transformational objectives (S03, S20). (2) It was written down: NZ$90m of work in progress was impaired in the year to June 2017 and a further NZ$11m in the September 2017 quarter, NZ$101m in total, figures confirmed in the bank's audited disclosure statement for 2018, with separate closure costs (S08, S04, S13, S24). (3) The bank's own disclosure said the board considered it highly unlikely that the project would meet its objectives (S02). The one completed phase, moving batch payments to an SAP engine, was kept (S08), and the bank later began a different, phased modernisation with other vendors (S16, S17); these are recorded as context, not as recovery of the programme.
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Customers | 840,000 (23% of NZ bank customers) | Feb 2014 | company_reported |
| Before | Estimated programme cost | NZ$100m or more over 3-4 years | Feb 2014 | company_reported |
| Before | Banking Group total operating revenue | NZ$479m | FY2014 | company_reported |
| During | Stake sold by NZ Post | 47% (NZ$494m) | Oct 2016 | multiple_independent |
| After | First impairment | NZ$90m (NZ$65m after tax) | Jun 2017 | company_reported |
| After | Total impairments | NZ$101m | Sep 2017 | multiple_independent |
| After | Kiwibank net profit after tax | NZ$53m vs NZ$124m | FY2017 | company_reported |
- company_reported
- A company statement, press release or investor presentation that no one has independently checked.
- multiple_independent
- Two or more independent sources agree.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsGate every go-live on measured readiness, not on the calendar BP-001
- SupportsDecide what truly differentiates before buying standard software; change the process for everything else BP-002
- SupportsName one accountable sponsor, keep sponsorship stable, and treat a leadership change as a re-baselining event BP-003
- SupportsMake a few quantified, dated commitments, publish them, and report against them, including the misses BP-004
- SupportsRoll out operational and system change in waves, each proven before the next BP-006
- SupportsTie every benefit to the financial statements, bank it before counting it, and keep tracking after the programme ends BP-010
- SupportsSimplify what you sell and the rules you run before you automate or scale them BP-011
- SupportsLimit how many things change at once, for the business and for the customer BP-012
- SupportsBudget the whole-life cost of a core programme, treat budget rises as new decisions, and retire legacy on a dated plan BP-013
- SupportsSequence customer-facing cutovers last, rehearse failure at full scale, and make resilience a programme outcome BP-014
- SupportsMake a business executive, not IT, the owner of a technology-led transformation BP-015
- SupportsOwn the technology that differentiates you, and rebuild the technology organisation before expecting speed BP-016
- SupportsDefine and freeze each programme metric before reporting it, and keep it comparable BP-034
- SupportsSeparate the programme's own effect from tailwinds, shocks and one-off gains before claiming credit BP-035
- SupportsDiligence the target's trajectory and the quality of its revenue, not its snapshot BP-038
- SupportsWrite exit and pause criteria at approval, and treat impairments as triggers to re-test the strategy BP-042
- SupportsRe-plan openly when the facts change, rather than defending the old timetable BP-043
- SupportsRecognise restructuring and integration costs early, in full, and separately from the savings BP-047
- SupportsDiagnose the root cause and the gap to the best before choosing the remedy BP-069
- SupportsBuild the enabling architecture and infrastructure before the applications that depend on it BP-071
Sources
- S01 Kiwibank profit smashed by big IT impairment · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2017-09-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S02 Even after $90 mln impairment Kiwibank's now largely redundant core banking system is still valued at... · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2017-09-14 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S03 Core project terminal for Kiwibank · not stated, Banking Day, 2017-12-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S04 Kiwibank interim profit drops $21 mln to $42 mln after IT impairment and higher expenses · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2018-02-23 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S05 Kiwibank books impairment on software assets · not stated, Reseller News, 2017-08-31 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S06 Recovered from CoreMod failure, Kiwibank focuses again on tech · Rob O'Neill, Reseller News, 2019-02-20 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S07 Kiwibank Banking Group's net profit hard hit by IT project impairment · not stated, New Zealand Herald, not stated · accessed 2026-11-05
- S08 Financial results: Kiwi Group Holdings (including Kiwibank), year ended 30 June 2017 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2017-09-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S09 Kiwibank hires SAP for $100 million core banking project · not stated, Finextra, not stated · accessed 2026-11-05
- S10 Kiwibank chooses SAP for major core banking system upgrade · Freya Purnell, InsideSAP, 2014-02-24 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S11 Kiwibank six month financial announcement July 2013 - December 2013 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2014-02-24 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S12 New core banking system for Kiwibank? · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2013-02-25 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S13 Kiwibank half year results, December 2017 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2018-02-23 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S14 Kiwibank annual profit rebounds after last year's IT hit · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2018-08-24 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S15 NZ Post says ACC, NZ Super Fund claim over Kiwibank sale has no merit · Paul McBeth, BusinessDesk, 2018-08-24 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S16 Under the covers: Kiwibank selects a new core to take it to the cloud · Rob O'Neill, Reseller News, 2022-02-09 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S17 Kiwibank goes live with ACI Worldwide's Enterprise Payments Platform · ACI Worldwide, Finextra (press release by ACI Worldwide), not stated · accessed 2026-11-05
- S18 Kiwibank's SAP-based core banking system project 'under review' · Debra Hamilton, InsideSAP, 2017-09-08 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S19 Owner of Kiwibank takes hit · Dene Mackenzie, Otago Daily Times, 2017-09-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S20 CEO Paul Brock appears to have checked out of Kiwibank with general manager of sales and service Mark Stephen stepping in · Gareth Vaughan, interest.co.nz, 2017-12-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S21 Kiwibank financial results briefing, 30 June 2014 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2014-08 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S22 Kiwibank financial results briefing, 30 June 2015 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2015-08 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S23 Improved operating profit; parcels overtakes letters revenue · New Zealand Post, Scoop (New Zealand Post press release), 2014-08-29 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S24 Kiwibank Limited Disclosure Statement for the year ended 30 June 2018 · Kiwibank, Kiwibank, 2018-08-22 · accessed 2026-11-05
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 5 November 2026
Practices, their evidence grades and case summaries are public. Full case studies are available in AXIOM to subscribers and AXIOM Discover participants.

