CS-215failure
PT Krakatau Steel (Persero) Tbk (Cilegon, Indonesia), state-owned steelmaker listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
Blast Furnace Complex at Cilegon: a 1.2 million-tonne-a-year ironmaking plant procured from 2007-2008 from a consortium led by China's MCC CERI with the subsidiary Krakatau Engineering, fired in December 2018 and halted in December 2019 after its slab costs proved higher than market prices
- Region
- Southeast Asia, East Asia
- Country
- Indonesia, China
- Industry
- Steel and Metals (Chemicals and Process Manufacturing)
- Functions
- Manufacturing & Production, Procurement & Strategic Sourcing, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office, Risk, Compliance & Internal Audit, Supply Chain & Logistics
- Topics
- Investment capital is not generating returns; Supplier inflation and procurement leakage are unsustainable; Margins are eroding despite revenue; Energy, resource or climate exposure undermines economics; Cash is trapped and liquidity is tightening
- Starting situation
- Completed (review)
- Period
- 2007–2023
- Last verified
- 5 November 2026
Executive summary
Krakatau Steel, Indonesia's state-owned steelmaker, set out to make its own iron in a 1.2 million-tonne blast furnace, procured from 2007-2008 from a consortium led by China's MCC CERI with its own subsidiary Krakatau Engineering [C01, C10, C13]. Planned for completion in 2014, the furnace was fired only in December 2018, years late [C01, C03, C06].
It ran commercially from July 2019 and was stopped in December 2019 because its slabs cost US$742 a tonne against a market price of US$476; a KPMG study warned that running it would deepen losses [C11, C12]. The company, which had lost money every year since 2012, restructured about US$2bn of debt in 2019-2020, and the minister responsible linked part of that debt to the halted furnace [C08, C09, C10].
In 2022 the Attorney General's Office alleged that the procurement was against the law and said the completed work was unusable, and in 2023 a court convicted five former executives, finding state losses of Rp 2.3 trillion and US$292m [C13, C15, C16]. The case shows how a capital project can fail on cost, design fit, delay and procurement integrity at once, and why a stop rule matters [C06, C12].
Outcome: failure
The initiative was abandoned, exited or written down, or an official finding called it a failure.
Basis of the outcome
The plant was abandoned in operation: it was fired in December 2018 (S03), ran commercially from July 2019 and was stopped in December 2019 because its slabs cost more than market prices (S11); the company put its internal slab cost at US$742 a tonne against a market price of US$476, and a KPMG study projected that running it for five years would worsen results and need up to US$2.5bn of working capital (S12). It had not been restarted by February 2022, when the company said it needed about US$100m more for a basic oxygen furnace to use it (S11, S12). Official statements: in 2022 the Attorney General's Office alleged that the procurement was carried out against the law and that the completed work could not be used, and put suspected state losses at Rp 6.9 trillion when it named five suspects (S13, S14). Official findings: in July 2023 the Serang Corruption Court convicted the former president director and four other executives, finding that they abused their authority to benefit the MCC CERI consortium and Krakatau Engineering and that the project caused state losses of Rp 2.3 trillion and US$292m (S15), and the Banten High Court upheld the verdicts in September 2023 (S16). The project had run 72 months late, according to a commissioner who resigned over it in 2019 (S06). Its cost is reported very differently: US$601m when announced in 2012 (S01, S17), US$656.3m in 2014 (S02), about US$714m of spending by the commissioner's account in 2019 (S06), about US$1bn of total investment in 2018 (S03), US$850m by the minister in 2021 (S10) and US$594m in 2022 (S11), against a contract the AGO said rose from Rp 4.7 trillion to Rp 6.9 trillion (S13); no source read reconciles them. Company context: Krakatau Steel lost money every year from 2012 to 2019 (S09), with 2012 revenue of US$2.29bn (S17), and restructured about US$2bn of bank debt in 2019-2020 (S08); the State-Owned Enterprises minister linked part of that debt to the US$850m blast furnace (S10).
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Announced cost | about US$601m | May 2012 | press_reported |
| Before | Planned completion | 2014 | May 2012 | press_reported |
| During | Contract value after addenda | Rp 6.9 trillion | 2022 | official_statement |
| During | Months behind schedule | 72 | Jul 2019 | press_reported |
| After | Internal slab cost against market | US$742 against US$476 a tonne | Feb 2022 | press_reported |
| After | State losses found by the court | Rp 2.3 trillion and US$292m | Jul 2023 | official_finding |
| After | Sentences | five years each for five former executives | Jul 2023 | official_finding |
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- official_statement
- A government or ministerial statement. It is official, but political, and is not a finding.
- official_finding
- A finding of an inquiry, court or regulator.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsBudget the whole-life cost of a core programme, treat budget rises as new decisions, and retire legacy on a dated plan BP-013
- SupportsMake bad news safe and fast to reach the top, and act on it BP-022
- SupportsBuild independent challenge into the board for transformational bets BP-024
- SupportsAfter a control or conduct failure, fix governance, leadership and incentives before strategy, and keep individual accountability proportionate and separate BP-025
- SupportsInvestigate failures independently at full scale, let outsiders validate the fix, and turn the findings into permanent checks BP-026
- SupportsScale risk, quality and control functions with the speed and size of the change BP-027
- SupportsFinance and size big bets so the company survives a downturn in the first years BP-040
- SupportsWrite exit and pause criteria at approval, and treat impairments as triggers to re-test the strategy BP-042
- SupportsRe-plan openly when the facts change, rather than defending the old timetable BP-043
- SupportsSecure the cash runway before you need it, and measure liquidity at its worst point BP-044
- SupportsProtect the integrity of procurement and appointments, and test feasibility before signing long contracts BP-068
- SupportsDiagnose the root cause and the gap to the best before choosing the remedy BP-069
- SupportsBuild the enabling architecture and infrastructure before the applications that depend on it BP-071
Sources
- S01 Krakatau to build BF · Tim Smith, Steel Times International, 2012-05-08 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S02 Krakatau Steel's blast furnace start date moved forward to H2 2015 · not stated, Fastmarkets, 2014-11-14 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S03 Krakatau Steel ignites blast furnace · not stated, Kallanish, 2018-12-26 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S04 Krakatau Steel vows to regain profit after six years of loss · Riska Rahman, The Jakarta Post, 2019-01-11 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S05 Meski Ekspor Baja Naik Hampir 300%, Krakatau Steel Terus Merugi · Ihya Ulum Aldin, Katadata, 2019-08-01 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S06 Waduh! Krakatau Steel Berpotensi Rugi Rp 1,3 T per Tahun · Anastasia Arvirianti, CNBC Indonesia, 2019-07-23 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S07 Krakatau Steel needs total overhaul: Kalla · News Desk, The Jakarta Post, 2019-07-24 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S08 Krakatau Steel restructures record $2 billion debt to stave off bankruptcy · Made Anthony Iswara, The Jakarta Post, 2020-01-29 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S09 Mengenal Permasalahan yang Membelit Krakatau Steel · CNN Indonesia, CNN Indonesia, 2020-01-30 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S10 KPK to investigate Krakatau Steel after SOEs minister's graft remarks · Fana Suparman and Heru Andriyanto, Jakarta Globe (reproduced by Asia Pacific Solidarity Network), 2021-09-29 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S11 Krakatau Steel scratches head over blast furnace · Divya Karyza, The Jakarta Post, 2022-02-15 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S12 Masih Dibebani Utang Rp31 Triliun, Ini Penyebab KRAS Setop Proyek Blast Furnace · Suparjo Ramalan, IDX Channel, 2022-02-15 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S13 Attorney General: State Losses Due To Corruption Of Krakatau Steel Reaches 6.9 Trillion · not stated, VOI, 2022-07-18 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S14 AGO Names 5 Corruption Suspects For BFC Krakatau Steel · not stated, VOI, 2022-07-18 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S15 Eks Dirut-Petinggi Krakatau Steel Divonis 5 Tahun Bui Kasus Blast Furnace · Bahtiar Rifa'i, detikNews, 2023-07-11 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S16 Eks Dirut Krakatau Steel Tetap Divonis 5 Tahun Terkait Kasus Korupsi · Bahtiar Rifa'i, detikNews, 2023-09-21 · accessed 2026-11-05
- S17 Krakatau continues with $1.2b expansion despite poor report · Raras Cahyafitri, The Jakarta Post, 2013-04-20 · accessed 2026-11-05
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 5 November 2026
Practices, their evidence grades and case summaries are public. Full case studies are available in AXIOM to subscribers and AXIOM Discover participants.

