CS-103mixed
Shane Co. (Shane and Company)
SAP point-of-sale and inventory-management system (contracted 2005, live September 2007) and the Chapter 11 that followed (2009-2010)
- Region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Industry
- Specialty Retail and Omnichannel Commerce
- Functions
- IT, ERP & Digital, Supply Chain & Logistics, Treasury & Working Capital, Strategy, Corporate Development & Transformation Office
- Topics
- Legacy ERP and fragmented systems block execution; Inventory is simultaneously excessive and unavailable; Technology spending is growing without business returns; Cash is trapped and liquidity is tightening
- Starting situation
- In-flight initiative
- Period
- 2005–2010
- Last verified
- 4 November 2026
Executive summary
Shane Co., the largest privately held US jeweller with about US$265m-275m of sales, signed with SAP in 2005 for a point-of-sale and inventory system budgeted at US$8m-10m and one year [C01, C04, C08]. It cost US$36m, took 32 months and went live in September 2007 [C01].
The company's bankruptcy papers said the system did not yet give accurate inventory counts, leaving stores overstocked with the wrong mix and hurting sales into 2008 [C02]. When its sales fell sharply in 2008 (to an expected US$207m-210m for the year, from US$275m), the chain filed for Chapter 11 in January 2009, naming the recession as the main cause and the system, expansion and a Thai subsidiary as drains on capital [C03, C04].
The court approved its plan in November 2010, after 21 months in Chapter 11, and the company announced its emergence in December, committed to pay creditors in full [C06, C07, C11, C12]. The numbers that matter: 3.6 times the budget, 32 months instead of 12, and an inventory the company could not count when its sales collapsed. The lesson: a mid-market firm must size an ERP programme to what it can afford if the business turns down during the build.
Outcome: mixed
Documented shortfalls or reversals sit alongside documented gains. For example: an initial failure later recovered, or a strategic goal met while a major adverse event in the same programme was recorded.
Basis of the outcome
The initiative assessed is the SAP system. It was contracted at an expected US$8m-10m and one year, and cost US$36m over 32 months before going live in September 2007; the company's Chapter 11 papers said it did not yet give accurate inventory counts, leaving the chain overstocked with the wrong mix and hurting sales into 2008 (S01). The papers named the fall in luxury sales as the largest cause of the January 2009 filing, with the system as a contributing one (S01, S02). By late 2008 the system was stable, though short of the contracted functionality, with contractors fixing the remaining problems, and no source read reports it abandoned or written off (S01). A system delivered late and far over budget, with documented harm to inventory and sales, alongside a stable system kept in use, meets the mixed criterion. The company's reorganisation is recorded as context, not as the system's result: the court approved a plan in November 2010 under which the company emerged, committed to pay creditors in full (S03, S04, S07).
Key figures
| Phase | Figure | Value | When | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | Net sales | US$265m | 2006 | press_reported |
| Before | Planned cost / time | US$8m-10m / 1 year | 2005 | press_reported |
| During | Actual cost / time | US$36m / 32 months | Sep 2007 | press_reported |
| During | Spend as share of revenue (consultant's calculation) | about 18% | 2009 | practitioner_research |
| During | Contractors fixing the system | 8 | late 2008 | press_reported |
| After | Net sales (2008, expected) | about US$207m-210m, from US$275m | 2008 | press_reported |
| After | Owed to top 20 unsecured creditors | US$26m | Jan 2009 | press_reported |
| After | Stores at emergence | 20 | Dec 2010 | press_reported |
| After | Creditors listed / of whom customers | about 6,000 / about 4,600 | Jan 2009 | press_reported |
| After | Owner loans deferred under the plan | US$10.5m DIP + US$20m pre-filing + about US$3m | 2010 | press_reported |
- press_reported
- A journalist's own reporting.
- practitioner_research
- Research by a practitioner body (e.g. CGAP), not peer-reviewed.
Practices this case bears on
- SupportsGate every go-live on measured readiness, not on the calendar BP-001
- SupportsIn distress, stabilise cash and cost first, repair the core next, and invest for growth only then BP-005
- SupportsLimit how many things change at once, for the business and for the customer BP-012
- SupportsBudget the whole-life cost of a core programme, treat budget rises as new decisions, and retire legacy on a dated plan BP-013
- SupportsTreat vendor attestations, awards and executive testimony as claims to test, not as assurance BP-019
- SupportsFinance and size big bets so the company survives a downturn in the first years BP-040
- SupportsRe-plan openly when the facts change, rather than defending the old timetable BP-043
- SupportsSecure the cash runway before you need it, and measure liquidity at its worst point BP-044
- SupportsPlan on the downside: assume the legacy business declines faster and the cycle turns, and have the cost playbook ready BP-054
- SupportsWhen a failure hits customers, tell them early, fix it completely, and compensate consistently BP-066
- SupportsUse a formal, supervised restructuring, prepared in advance, when informal rescues have failed BP-075
- SupportsProtect operations, customers and staff explicitly from the first day of a restructuring BP-077
Sources
- S01 SAP Project Costs Cited in Jeweler's Bankruptcy Filing · Chris Kanaracus, PCWorld (IDG News Service), 2009-01-14 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S02 Notes on Shane · Rob Bates, JCK, 2009-01-13 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S03 Shane Co. emerges from Chapter 11 (headline not shown on the page) · not stated, Littleton Independent, 2010-12 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S04 Interview With Tom Shane · Rob Bates, JCK, 2010-11-11 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S07 Shane Co. Exits Chapter 11 · Daniel Ford, JCK, 2010-11-10 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S05 Shane Company: Lessons Learned From an ERP Implementation Failure · not stated, Panorama Consulting Group, 2009-01-15 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S08 Shane Co Announces Successful Emergence From Chapter 11 Reorganization · Shane Co., GlobeNewswire, 2010-12-21 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S09 Shane Files Reorganization Plan · Daniel Ford, JCK, 2010-08-12 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S10 Shane Vows To Repay Claims In Reorganization Plan · Nick Malinowski, Law360, 2010-08-12 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S11 Shane Gets OK For Ch. 11 Plan To Repay Creditors · Nick Malinowski, Law360, 2010-11-11 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S12 Diamonds Are Forever, But the Shane Co. Files for Bankruptcy · Michael de Yoanna, 5280 Magazine, 2009-01-13 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S13 Jewelry Retailer Shane Co., Files for Chapter 11 (Updated) · Edahn Golan, IDEX Online, 2009-01-13 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S14 Shane Co. files for Chapter 11 (headline not shown on the page) · Rob Bates, JCK, 2009-01-12 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S15 Juwelierkette gibt SAP Mitschuld an Firmenpleite · Frank Niemann, Computerwoche, 2009-01-15 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S16 Cautionary Tale of Big Bloated Software Destroying A Business · Elissa Fink, Tableau Software (blog), 2009-01-20 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S17 Shane Company, A Jewelry Retailer With Atlanta Area Locations, Files Chapter 11 - Most Creditors Are Customers · not stated (blog of Scott B. Riddle), Georgia Bankruptcy Blog, 2009-01-12 · accessed 2026-11-04
- S18 Recovering From ERP Bankruptcy · Panorama Consulting Group, Panorama Consulting Group, 2012-03-23 · accessed 2026-11-04
Researched and fact-checked knowledgebase · Knowledgebase built 5 November 2026 · Last verified 4 November 2026
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